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ABSTRACT 
The impact of regulations in minimizing the detrimental effects of insider trading is 
unsettled. In this paper, we investigate the impact of the introduction of the Securities 
Market Amendment Act 2002 in New Zealand on several aspects of the market. After 
examining a sample of companies listed before and after the new laws introduction, 
we find strong evidence of a reduction in the cost of capital, bid-ask spreads and 
volatility accompanied by increases in liquidity, all as predicted. We conclude that the 
change in regulations has had a positive impact on the market.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The merits of regulating insider trading have been the subject of vigorous debate in 
the finance literature since Manne (1966) suggested unfettered insider trading should 
be encouraged. The basis of the debate has been the costs and benefits of insider 
trading on the market as a whole. Manne (1966) and others have argued that insider 
trading has a beneficial effect on the price efficiency of a market and by extension the 
efficiency of its resource allocation and investment decision making (Kyle, 1985; 
Leland, 1992). The contention from those favouring regulation however, is that 
insider trading damages investor confidence in the market and as such has serious 
effects on the stock market including increased bid ask spreads, cost of capital and 
market volatility in addition to reduced liquidity. While the academic debate on 
deregulation is still unsettled, it appears that insider trading has been accepted by 
most countries as a necessary evil. However, rather than the unencumbered insider 
trading envisioned by Manne (1966), it has been regulated in over 80% of countries 
with capital markets (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). The regulations seek to strike 
a balance between allowing insiders enough opportunity to trade to allow the market 
to receive the benefits of their superior pricing ability while limiting the harm to 
ordinary shareholders from insiders’ use of confidential information. The literature to 
date has failed to conclusively show how successful the attempts to regulate a 
balance have been in controlling insider trading.  
 
Impact of Insider Trading 
The issue of insider trading has been widely addressed with much focus on the fact 
that insider trading is inequitable for outside investors who lack access to the same 
information as insiders. Numerous studies in a number of markets around the world 
show almost uniformly that insiders earn positive abnormal returns1. These profits 
however, are earned at the expense of uniformed investors who ultimately are those 
trading against insiders. Ausbel (1990) concludes that the presence of insiders’ in a 
market causes other investors to lose confidence in the market which has flow-on-
effects for market efficiency.  
 
One of the most noticeable effects of insider trading is its influence on bid-ask 
spreads. Insiders due to their access to preferential information hold a significant 
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advantage over the rest of the market allowing them to expropriate sizeable trading 
profits. This poses a significant risk to other investors in the market, a risk that 
increases with the prevalence of insiders in the market. To counter this risk, market 
makers increase the bid-ask spreads to offset the expected losses from trading 
against insiders (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Copeland and Galai,  
1988). As a result, firms and markets where insider trading is pervasive are subject to 
increased spreads to accommodate the greater informational asymmetry risk. Chung 
and Charoenwong (1998) examined the impact of insider trading intensity on the bid 
ask spreads by comparing spreads on insider trading days to other days. They 
concluded that without disclosure the market was unable to determine when an 
insider trades. As a result market makers maintained larger spreads for stocks were 
the incidence of insider trading was greater and at times of abnormally high volume 
to compensate for the extra information asymmetry in those companies.  
 
The effect on spreads is compounded by the effect insider trading has on 
market liquidity. Liquidity is a key determinant of bid-asks and the reduction in 
liquidity as a result of insider trading increases the spreads even further. Ausbel 
(1990) suggests that when outsiders expect to be taken advantage of, they are likely 
to reduce their investment in the market from the start. This contention is supported 
by Bernhadt, Hollifield and Hughson (1995) who argued that investors are likely to 
make investment decisions on the basis of the amount of information asymmetry, 
seeking projects with a lower risk of expropriation by insiders. They point out that this 
can lead to market distortions with investors selecting projects based on the risk of 
exploitation rather than the economic merits of projects. Fishman and Hagerty 
(1995), Leland (1992) and Repullo (1999) in their theoretical models all predict a 
decrease in liquidity in situations where insider trading is more intense.  
 
The reduction in liquidity can also be linked to a decrease in market depth. 
This lack of depth means that the market lacks the ability to soak up significant 
volumes of shares traded without impacting on the price due to limited demand and 
supply for shares. Kyle (1985), Leland (1992) and Repullo (1999) predict that the 
presence of insiders reduces the depth of the market and thereby increases the 
volatility that investors face. This is significant in that it increases the risk for investors 
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that they will not be able to exit their investment or the market without facing a large 
financial penalty. 
 
Insider trading has also been linked to increases in the cost of capital. This is 
a result of a number of factors such as the need to cover the increased transaction 
costs caused by the larger bid ask spreads, the increased risk of being unable to sell 
an investment in a timely fashion without a large financial penalty and decline in 
corporate governance (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002).  This link was established 
empirically by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) who examined the impact of 
introducing insider trading laws and the first enforcement on four proxies for the cost 
of capital across 103 countries. They found that a significant decrease occurred 
following the first successful enforcement of insider trading sanctions, although there 
was no significant reaction to the introduction of the laws.  
 
Insider trading has been both theoretically and empirically shown to have 
serious outcomes for capital markets. Increased spreads, increased volatility and 
decreased liquidity all reduce the ability of the market to fulfil its function with flow-on-
effects for resource allocation. The increased cost of capital for companies 
introduces further distortions, such as forcing companies to reject efficient projects. 
While both the harm and the beneficial effects of insider trading have been 
established, the impact that regulation has is still the subject some controversy.  
 
The Role of Regulation 
The role of regulation and laws should be to minimise the harm from insider trading. 
As has been argued, insider trading causes distortions in capital markets such as 
inefficient resource allocation, mispricing and lost opportunities for investment. 
However, the evidence on the efficacy of regulation in this respect is mixed. Several 
papers have examined the impact of changes in insider trading laws on the 
profitability and volume of insider trading. Jaffe (1974) analysed the impact that three 
major cases that occurred in the US in the 1960’s had on insider trading. The author 
argued that the three cases all either extended the reach of the law or demonstrated 
the will to enforce the legislation which had not been enforced since its enactment in 
1934. Interestingly, the paper was unable to find a significant decrease in profitability 
or volume before and after either the cases individually or collectively. Jaffe 
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suggested that while the law changes made the regime more restrictive they were 
still primarily aimed at the most flagrant cases and therefore did not have a major 
impact. Seyhun (1992) conducted examination of the effects of legislative changes 
and case law during the 1980’s, a period in which the SEC focused its enforcement 
efforts on insider trading and the penalties for the exploitation of material non-public 
information were increased markedly. Looking at the profitability and volume he 
concluded that the regulatory changes had been ineffective in controlling insider 
trading. Banerjee and Ekard (2001) examine insider trading prior to mergers between 
1897 and 1903 and find that the patterns and price run-ups are similar to those found 
prior to recent mergers. They conclude that insider trading laws have been ineffective 
in preventing insider trading although they do suggest this maybe the result of a 
growth in information specialists supplanting pure insiders.  
 
By contrast, several recent studies have concluded that both amendments to 
and the introduction of insider trading laws have impacted on the market. 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) employed a sample of over 100 countries to 
examine the impact on the cost of capital of a countries enactment and the first 
successful enforcement of insider trading laws. They concluded that while the 
enactment of the laws did not have a significant effect, the first enforcement resulted 
in a marked decrease in the cost of capital regardless of the proxy used to measure 
it. Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2003) employed the same sample to examine the 
impact of insider trading on analyst following, arguing that the presence of insiders 
crowds out analysts resulting in reduced coverage. They concluded that for 
developed markets the first introduction of insider trading laws sees a significant 
increase in analyst following while emerging markets require the laws to be 
successfully enforced before any benefit materialises. This was supported at the firm-
level by Gilbert, Tourani-Rad and Wisneiwski (2004) who found that even after 
controlling for other effects, higher firm-level insider trading resulted in fewer analysts 
following a company.  
 
Garfinkel (1997) looked specifically at insider trading around earnings 
announcements both before and after the introduction of the Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) of 1988. The author observed a marked 
change in the behaviour of insiders who went from trading prior to and in the same 
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direction as the earnings surprise prior to the law change to trading after and against 
the direction of the shock afterwards. They also concluded that earnings 
announcements were more informative in the post change period suggesting less 
information trading before the announcement. This pattern has also been observed in 
other US studies such as Noe (1999) who looked at management earnings forecasts 
and Piotroski and Roulstone (2003) who concluded that after the introduction of the 
ITSFEA insiders were trading on their ability to predict accurately share prices in the 
long-term rather than upcoming announcements.  
 
The evidence on the effects of regulatory change is mixed. Earlier studies that 
concentrated on profitability and volume of insider trading failed to find evidence of 
significant market adjustment. However, later studies that have examined other 
aspects such as the information used to trade, the timing of the trades, effect on the 
cost of capital and analyst following have noted significant changes. It may be that 
recent improvements in the technology available for detecting insider trading have 
had an impact on insider conduct or that regulations fail to prevent insider trading 
being profitable but do significantly impact other areas. Either way more research on 
additional markets is needed to clarify the role of regulations in controlling and 
minimising the detrimental consequences of insider trading. Evidence of the impact 
of regime changes is limited outside the US making the examination of other markets 
important in discounting the possibility that the US’s long history of regulating insider 
trading may make its reaction unrepresentative of other markets.   
 
The New Zealand Situation 
The recent legislative changes to insider trading in New Zealand provide a good 
opportunity to add further evidence to the debate regarding the efficacy of 
regulations. Prior to 2002 insider trading was governed by the Securities Market Act 
1988. There has been much commentary on this acts effectiveness based on 
anecdotal evidence. In particular, it has been argued the law was ineffective as it had 
failed to result in a successful prosecution despite being in effect for over a decade. 
This was further reinforced by several cases in the early 1990’s which effectively 
weakened the enforcement mechanisms contained within the act2. The criticism 
appears to be justified in two major areas, the disclosure requirements set out in the 
act and the enforcement regime it established.  
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The disclosure requirements in the act set out differing disclosure requirements 
based on the class of corporate insider. The problem however, was that the length of 
time between trade and disclosure was inversely related to the information hierarchy 
within in a firm as established in Seyhun (1998). Substantial shareholders, those 
holding more than 5% of the voting rights, were required to disclose details of their 
trades within 5 working days. Directors, on the other hand, were required to disclose 
their transactions only in the annual reports. This represents a minimum delay 
between the end of the financial year and the publication of the report of 3 months 
with an average delay between trade and disclosure of 9-10 months (Etebari, 
Tourani-Rad and Gilbert, 2003). Executives, those identified by Seyhun (1998) as 
having the best access to information were not required to disclose their transactions 
at all. Given the finding by Chung and Charoenwong (1998) that the market is unable 
to detect insider trading without disclosure, the long delays reduce the informational 
benefits to the market from insider trading considerably. According to the model of 
Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001) the lack of timely disclosure makes insider 
trades more profitable both over time and on a per round basis. The findings of 
Etebari, et al. (2003) and Gilbert et al. (2004) support this by showing that the delay 
in disclosure in New Zealand between directors and large blockholders allowed 
directors to earn significantly larger abnormal returns. It also supports the perception 
that the laws were ineffective in minimising the harm from insider trading.  
 
The second major area of concern was the enforcement mechanisms set out 
in the law. Rather than relying on a public enforcement regime such as is employed 
in the US and the UK, the Securities Market Act (1988) relied on private enforcement. 
The company in whom the trading took place and the other party to the trade were 
permitted to take a suit for insider trading. This placed the burden of proof on those 
with the least access to the information and expertise required to establish if illegal 
insider trading occurred. Compounding this was the fact that only the company was 
able to sue for punitive damages and private individuals were only able to recover the 
value of loss that they personally incurred, making it uneconomical to pursue a case. 
Companies have also proven reluctant to prosecute their own insiders even in high 
profile cases.  
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In response to the ineffectiveness of the previous regime, the Securities 
Market Amendment Act (2002) was enacted and came into force on the 1 December 
2002. This act has sort to address weaknesses in the old act with the most profound 
changes addressing the above deficiencies in the regulations. The new law requires 
that all corporate insiders; blockholders, directors and executives, disclose within 5 
working days. The new act also gives the Securities Commission, the local securities 
watchdog, the ability to take over a company’s right of action where it chooses not to 
sue. The combined effect of these changes should be a marked increase in the 
expected cost of insider trading as blatant breaches are more likely to be prosecuted 
and, at the same time, a reduction in the profitability of the insider trading due to the 
new disclosure laws.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine these recent changes in insider 
trading legislation to see if they have had the expected impact on the market. This 
will also allow us to add further to the debate on the efficacy of regulations and 
regulatory changes in controlling insider trading and its negative implications. We 
examine the average level of four variables, dividend yield, bid ask spreads, liquidity 
and volatility, in the pre and post change periods to determine if the law changes 
have minimised the influence of the negative aspects of insider trading on the 
market. Using a sample of 85 companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZX) over the period 1996-2004 we examine the level of each variable in the two 
periods. We use a variety of testing methods including the matched pairs t-test, the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test, rolling regressions and fixed effect panel regressions to 
see if the variables experienced statistically significant changes in the expected 
directions. We find marked decreases over all the tests employed for the dividend 
yield (a proxy for cost of capital), bid ask spreads and volatility. We also see 
significant increases in the total value of traded shares in the post change period. 
The results give support to the hypothesis that the recent changes have had a 
beneficial impact on the market as a whole.  
 
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 contains information on 
the sample and variable construction along with the methodology employed. Section 
3 presents the results of the testing while Section 4 presents the papers conclusions.  
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SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample 
The sample employed in this study was drawn from companies that were listed on 
the New Zealand Exchange between January 1996 and March 2004. Only 
companies that survived over the entire period were considered to allow for a more 
accurate appraisal of the effect of the change in insider trading laws by eliminating 
potential fundamental changes in the composition of the sample. This resulted in a 
sample of 85 companies with 8416 firm-months worth of observations.  
 
Data on volume, bid prices, ask prices, dividend yield and market 
capitalisation were obtained from Thompson Financials DataStream. Information on 
cross-listing dates was obtained from the Datex market announcements database.  
 
To establish whether the change in regulation has had an impact on the 
market we performed an analysis of a number of microstructure aspects that have 
been both theoretically and empirically shown to be affected by insider trading. We 
examine the impact by studying these variables in two time periods, the pre-change 
period from January 1996 to December 2001 and the post-change period from 
December 2002 to March 2004. As the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002 
spent most of 2002 working through the legislative process there is a possibility that 
the market may have anticipated the act given its main provisions were well 
established and widely known prior to enactment. For this reason January 2002 to 
November 2002 were examined separately to see if there was any evidence of the 
market reacting before the act came into power. The change period was also tested 
separately in the panel regressions, but in results not reported was shown to not be 
significant.  
 
Variables 
We examine the impact of the recent law changes on four variables to see whether 
the recent law has minimised the harm from insider trading in the local market. The 
first variable we examined is the dividend yield which we use to proxy for the firm 
level cost of capital. As noted in a number of studies the cost of capital is difficult to 
 9 
determine directly (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000). For 
this reason proxies have been employed to examine the impact of differing events on 
the cost of capital. One of the proxies suitable for a firm-level examination of the cost 
of capital is the dividend yield. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) provide a detailed 
examination of the link between the cost of capital in general pricing models and 
dividends, but as was noted by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) a simple 
approximate way of calculating the cost of equity is simply to back it out of the 
constant growth dividend valuation model. They also point out that the dividend 
yields are easily observed and do not move much making them an excellent proxy for 
estimating the effect of a discrete change in the laws. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) 
also conclude that in the case of small samples, dividend yields are superior to the 
other method advocated by Henry (2000) of using realised returns as a proxy for cost 
of capital as returns are more variable. As a result, we employ dividend yields to 
examine the impact of the change in the law on the cost of capital. We measure the 
dividend yield as the annualised dividend yield.  
 
The second variable examined was the bid-ask spread (BA) defined as 
 




+
−=
2/)(
)(ln
BidAsk
BidAskBA  
 
This definition is similar to that Chung and Charoenwong (1998) who 
examined the impact of insider trading on spreads. Unlike that paper however, we 
use closing bid and ask prices to measure the spread. Interday prices have been 
used in a number of papers examining the bid-ask spreads (Jain, 2002; Acker, 
Stalker and Tonks, 2002). Closing prices were used as they are more appropriate 
given the length of sample period being examined and due to the difficulty of 
obtaining intraday data in New Zealand. As was shown in Acker et al. (2002), 
interday closing prices are a reasonable estimator of the actual spread. We use the 
log transformation to reduce the skewness in the spreads. 
 
Another variable examined was liquidity. A number of papers have asserted 
that insider trading reduces liquidity (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; 
Copeland and Galai, 1988; Ausbel, 1990; Leland, 1992; Repullo, 1999). If the new 
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laws are effective, therefore, we would expect liquidity to improve. We measure 
liquidity by taking the dollar value of daily trading and dividing it by the market 
capitalisation to standardise the variable across companies. This measure was used 
by Jain (2002) and produces similar results to the average volume traded measure 
employed in Acker et al. (2002) and Chung and Charoenwong (1998).  
 
The final variable inspected is the return variance of firms. Kyle (1985) argues 
that the presence of insider trading reduces the depth of a market, making it less 
liquid and prone to greater price movements. Less insider trading should therefore 
imply greater market depth and more liquidity resulting in less volatility over time. We 
define return variance as the natural log of the variance of the midpoint of spreads of 
the previous 30 days.  As per Jain (2002) we use the midpoints to avoid any potential 
bias from the bid ask bounce. As variances are expected to follow a chi-square 
distribution and exhibit skewness we use a log transformation to allow reliable t-
statistics to be obtained.  
 
Methodology 
To determine whether the recent law changes were effective we examined the level 
of each of the variables in the pre and post periods. To test this we use a variety of 
tests including the matched pairs t-test which examines whether the difference in the 
yearly means are significantly different from zero. We also use the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test to determine whether there has been a significant change in the mean. For 
this testing we compared the means on a yearly basis with the last 12 months of data 
following the change, April 2003 – March 2004. This was done to maintain the 
comparability of the samples and to allow the full effect of the changes to be 
examined without potential bias during the implementation period. Rolling 
regressions, regressing the last 100 observations against a constant were also 
employed. This was performed by taking an equally weighted average of each 
variables and regressing it against a constant to compute the estimate and two 
standard deviations. This was then plotted over time to provide a graphical 
representation of the regression estimate over time (Driffill and Sola, 1998). Finally, 
we employ fixed effect panel regressions on firm-month level data of each variable 
against a dummy variable that equals 1 in the months following the introduction of the 
new laws. These regressions also include several control variables, MV, defined as 
 11 
the natural log of the firms market capitalisation and CROSS which is a dummy 
variable that equals one for each month that a firm has a cross listing on another 
exchange. This is used to control for firms that are subjected to the laws of another 
exchange and therefore may already be subjected to tighter regulations. As a 
robustness check we employed the F test to test the significance of group effects in 
each of the model specifications employed. We found uniformly that the fixed effect 
panel is superior compared to the restricted model. Further, the fixed model was 
preferred as it does not suffer from the omitted variable problem that can plague the 
random effect models (Hausman and Taylor, 1982; Chamerlain, 1978). As a 
specification test we also re-estimate our panel regressions using an adjustment for 
serial correlation in the errors. In particular, the regressions include a lagged error 
term from a two stage regression. 
 
RESULTS 
To address the effectiveness of the new laws we examined four variables that have 
been predicted to be impacted by insider trading. If the new laws have been effective 
then the cost of insider trading should have increased. The new disclosure rules 
should ensure the market becomes informed more rapidly reducing ongoing profits to 
insiders as predicted by Huddart et al. (2001). The provision allowing the Securities 
Commission to prosecute insider trading should increase the likelihood of 
prosecutions against insiders. It would be expected therefore that there should be 
less information asymmetry in the market as well as reduced information driven 
insider trading. If the new laws are effective there should be a reduction in dividend 
yields, a sign of decreased cost of capital, decreased bid ask spreads and volatility 
as well as increased liquidity as the New Zealand market becomes seen as less 
risky.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 gives summary statistics based on firm-month data for the variables used. 
The BA spread has an arithmetic average of .0768, or a spread of 7.68% of the price. 
This is significantly larger than the average spreads reported in the US (Chung and 
Charoenwong (1998) report 1.83%) or the UK (Acker et al. (2002) report 2.3%). This 
is likely due to the small size of the market with its resulting low liquidity. The table 
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also shows that on average .08% of a firms’ market value is traded on a daily basis 
with an average of 143,000 shares traded. This variable however has a large 
standard deviation indicating that there is a large difference between the average 
shares traded of the most and least liquid companies on the New Zealand market. 
VAR had an average of .00033, while DY had an average of .0575. The latter value 
is higher compared to other markets due to the tendency of NZ companies to pay out 
larger dividends than companies elsewhere. The average firm market capitalisation 
over the sample period was just NZ$ 91 million indicating that companies in New 
Zealand are much smaller than their counterparts in other developed markets3. 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
BA -3.5298 1.1757 -4.4040 -3.6877 -2.8406
VOL 0.0008 0.0015 0.0001 0.0004 0.0009
VAR -8.0120 1.6738 -8.8899 -8.0588 -7.0770
DY 0.0575 0.1188 0.0000 0.0348 0.0600
MV 4.5150 2.0434 3.0474 4.4581 5.8491  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Note:  BA defined as the natural log of the monthly average of the daily ask price minus 
the bid price divided by the midpoint of the spreads.  VOL represents the firm’s liquidity 
defined as the monthly average of the daily dollar value of trading divided by the market 
value of the company. MV is the natural log of the firms market capitalization averaged 
for the calendar month.  VAR represents the return volatility of the firm defined as the 
natural log of the variance of returns over the period -30,0, averaged over each 
calendar month. DY is defined as the monthly average of the annualised dividend yield.  
MV is the log of the firms market capitalization averaged for the calendar month. 
 
The sample cross correlations are presented in Table 2. Bid-ask spreads (BA) 
have significant negative relationships with VOL, MV, CROSS, and DY, indicating 
that lower spreads are associated with larger more liquid companies, as well as 
companies that are cross-listed on other markets. We also see lower spreads are 
associated with companies with higher dividend yields, likely a result of the higher 
rate of dividends that larger companies pay out. The positive relationship with VAR 
suggests that lower variance is associated with lower spreads. VAR has negative 
associations with MV, and DY implying that larger companies and companies with 
higher dividend yields have lower volatility of returns. Finally, we also see strong 
relationships in the predicted directions between POST and all key variables, BA (-) 
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DY (-) VAR (-) and VOL (+). This lends some preliminary support to the hypothesis 
that the changes in law have had a positive impact on the market.  
 
VOL VAR MV CROSS POST DY
BA -0.0572 0.2211 -0.6949 -0.0602 -0.0731 -0.0421
(0.0344) (0.0023) (0.0001) (0.0311) (0.0214) (0.0609)
VOL -0.0116 0.0585 -0.0003 0.0605 -0.0146
(0.3974) (0.0329) (0.9818) (0.0309) (0.3121)
VAR -0.3710 0.0543 -0.0653 -0.2874
(0.0007) (0.1380) (0.0267) (0.0013)
MV 0.2460 0.0174 0.1759
(0.0018) (0.2512) (0.0037)
CROSS 0.0518 0.0124
(0.0414) (0.3744)
POST -0.0798
(0.0180)  
Table 2: Sample Cross Correlations  
 
Note: p-values are in parentheses. BA defined as the natural log of the monthly average of the 
daily ask price minus the bid price divided by the midpoint of the spreads.  VOL represents the 
firms liquidity defined as the monthly average of the daily dollar value of trading divided by the 
market value of the company. VAR represents the return volatility of the firm and is defined as the 
natural log of the variance of returns over the period -30,0, averaged over each calendar month. 
MV is the natural log of the firms market capitalization averaged for the calendar month. . CROSS 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 for those months in which a firm is cross-listed on another 
exchange. POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all firm-months from December 2002 
onwards. DY is defined as the monthly average of the annualised dividend yield.   
 
Dividend Yield 
Dividend yield has been used in a number of studies to examine the impact of market 
changes on the cost of capital. While the cost of capital is difficult to estimate papers 
have shown that dividend yield and cost of capital are closely related. Bekaert and 
Harvey (2000) discuss the theory behind this relationship and conclude that dividend 
yield is an easily observable and stationary variable. It, therefore, is an excellent 
proxy for viewing the effect of dramatic structural changes on the market. 
Bhattachraya and Daouk (2002) in applying this model note that it is possibly better 
suited to examining the effect of insider trading laws introduction than market 
liberalisation, the purpose of the Bekaert and Harvey (2000) study. They conclude 
that the major weakness of the dividend yield measure, is that the dividend growth 
rate must be stationary. This is more likely to be true for changes in insider trading 
laws as it has no real impact on the company’s growth rate.  
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Panel A: Difference in Mean Dividend Yield
Mean T-Stat p -values Wilcoxon p -values
Pre Regulation Change
1996 0.0557 -2.2333 0.0286 -2.0230 0.0215
1997 0.0626 -2.7362 0.0078 -3.1026 0.0010
1998 0.0753 -3.8812 0.0002 -5.4245 0.0000
1999 0.0654 -2.9147 0.0047 -3.7278 0.0001
2000 0.0609 -2.9536 0.0042 -3.8554 0.0001
2001 0.0588 -2.6656 0.0094 -3.1682 0.0008
Change Period
2002 0.0527 -1.6933 0.0946 -1.9385 0.0263
Post Change
Post 0.0323
Panel B: Panel Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Post -0.0276 *** -0.0071 *** -0.0272 *** -0.0069 ***
(0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0012)
MV -0.0069 *** -0.0091 ***
(0.0010) (0.0016)
CROSS 0.0100 *** -0.0003
(0.0034) (0.0062)
AR(1) 0.9367 *** 0.9364 ***
(0.0045) (0.0046)
R-Squared 0.8521 0.9778 0.8532 0.9778
Durbin-Watson Statistic 0.1616 1.9370 0.1621 1.9420
 Table 3: Impact of Regulatory Change on Dividend Yield 
 
Note: *** Significant at 1%,  ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample consists of 8330 firm months observations. All 
yearly means were calculated as calendar years with the exception of the post change period where 
the sample ran from April 2003 to March 2004. T-Stats were calculated using the matched pairs t-test. 
The dependent variable in all models is DY defined as the monthly average of the annualised dividend 
yield.  Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firm months after December 2003, the time of the 
regulatory change. MV is the natural log of the firms market capitalization averaged for the calendar 
month.  CROSS is a dummy variable that equals 1 for those months in which a firm is cross-listed on 
another exchange. AR(1) is an autoregressive term of which the coefficient is fixed across cross-
sectional units.  
 
The results in Table 3 provide strong support for the hypothesis that the law 
change resulted in a substantial decrease in dividend yields. Panel A reports the test 
results of the mean level of DY before the change with the average after the change. 
As can be seen the average has decreased from between .055 to .0753 before the 
change period to just .0323 afterwards. This decrease is significant at the 1% level 
based on both the matched pairs t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank tests in all 
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periods except for 1996 where it is significant at the 5% level. It is also interesting to 
note that based on both the mean and the t-statistic there appears to be some pre-
emption of the change. For the 2002 period there appears to be a decrease in the 
mean dividend yield with a resulting decrease in the significance of the differences 
between the 2002 period and the post period.  
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Figure 1: Rolling Regressions of Dividend Yield against a Constant  
 
Note- The vertical axis represents the estimate from a regression run on the previous 100 daily 
dividend yield averaged over 85 companies against a constant. The dividend yield is defined as 
the annualised dividend yield. The vertical line represents the date the new legislation came into 
force.   
 
This pre-emption is to a certain extent supported by the rolling regressions 
presented in Figure 1. There is a decrease in the average dividend yield starting at 
approximately December 2001, however it reverses and starts to increase about the 
middle of 2002. The graph shows more vividly the significant impact on dividend yield 
once the new law came into force on the 1st December 2002 (represented by the 
vertical line). After that date we see a very sharp and rapid decrease before DY 
settles at a new stable level after October 2003. This indicates there was a sharp 
adjustment in the cost of capital brought about by the increase in the expected cost 
of insider trading.  
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The panel regression results presented in Table 3 Panel B also reject the hypothesis 
of no impact on the dividend yield from the regulatory change. The results show that 
the dummy variable for all months following the change period, POST, is significant 
at the 1% level in the four regression models employed. After controlling for 
autocorrelation by introducing an autoregressive term the relationship between POST 
and DY still remains strong. The regressions in Models 3 and 4 also include several 
control variables that may have impacted on the relationship. As can be seen the MV 
variable is also captures a significant proportion of the variation in DY while the 
CROSS variable is only relevant when the AR(1) is omitted from the regression. 
Controlling for both firm size and cross listings has little impact on the significance of 
the POST variable. The model also captures a significant proportion of the variation 
in dividend yield with an adjusted R2 of .97 in Models 2 and 4.  
 
The results of the testing strongly support the view that the DY has decreased 
significantly as a result of the introduction of new insider trading laws. The average 
mean, according to both parametric and non-parametric tests has decreased 
markedly. Figure 1 employing rolling regressions shows that the change occurred 
soon after the introduction of the new laws and finally the panel regressions revealed 
a very strong decline in DY after the law change. This indicates that there was a 
dramatic structural change in the cost of capital of New Zealand firms following the 
date that the new laws came into effect. 
 
Bid Ask Spreads 
Several papers have developed theoretical models that make predictions about the 
effect insider trading has on the bid ask spread. Copeland and Galai (1988), Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) have all predicted a positive relationship 
between the prevalence of insider trading and the spreads that market makers set. 
This has also been supported by Chung and Charoenwong (1998) empirically who 
found that market makers, although not able to spot exactly when an insider trades, 
set greater spreads on firms with a greater incidence of insider trading to 
compensate for their losses to informed traders in the long run. The recent law 
changes in New Zealand should have raised the cost of insider trading and resulted 
in a reduction of the incidence as insiders trade less. As such and in line with both 
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the theoretical and empirical evidence we would expect to see a significant decrease 
in the spreads on companies in the New Zealand market.  
 
Table 4 presents the results for the tests on the bid ask spreads. As can be 
observed in Panel A there is strong evidence of a significant decrease in the level of 
the spreads in the post change periods. The mean bid ask spreads declined from an 
average of 3.95% (-3.23) to 2.65% (-3.63) to a post change mean of 2.23% (-3.79). 
The difference in means is significant at the 1% level from 1998 onwards including 
the change period of 2002, with 1996 at the 5% level and 1997 at 10%. These 
significance levels are also repeated for the Wilcoxon test values with only 1996 and 
1997 having p-values above the 1% level. Figure 2 also supports the notion of the 
impact of the regulatory change. The rolling regressions show an immediate 
decrease following the new regime commencing. The graph also shows that the 
decline in spreads appears to be slowing down after having dropped to its lowest 
point observed over the sample period.  
 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the panel regression results for the spreads. The 
coefficient estimates also support the belief that there has been a decrease in the 
spreads following the introduction of the new laws. The POST variable is significant 
in all specifications at the 1% level. MV has a very strong association with the 
spreads in all the models supporting the cross correlations presented in Table 2. 
Again the results show that CROSS is only relevant when the AR(1) term is 
excluded. The same is true of the VAR and VOL measures which were included to 
control for the liquidity and volatility determinants of the spreads. Both these 
variables are important before the model is adjusted to account for serial correlation 
of the residuals although they do appear to have an effect due to the much reduced 
significance level when both they and the AR(1) term are included together. Again 
the adjusted R2 suggests that the models fit the data well. The results therefore all 
point to a significant decrease in the spreads following the regulatory amendments.  
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Panel A: Differences in Mean Bid Ask Spreads
Mean T-Stat p-values Wilcoxon p-values
Pre Regulation Change
1996 -3.6027 -2.2546 0.0268 -2.0529 0.0200
1997 -3.6315 -1.9456 0.0551 -1.4920 0.0679
1998 -3.2308 -7.9399 0.0000 -6.3061 0.0000
1999 -3.5099 -4.3871 0.0000 -4.5713 0.0000
2000 -3.4984 -3.9294 0.0002 -4.3081 0.0000
2001 -3.4544 -5.7297 0.0000 -5.4855 0.0000
Change Period
2002 -3.5180 -5.2523 0.0000 -5.5881 0.0000
Post Change
Post -3.7943
Panel B: Panel Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Post -0.2334 *** -0.1742 *** -0.2021 *** -0.1588 *** -0.2019 *** -0.1590 ***
(0.0153) (0.0284) (0.0144) (0.0266) (0.0145) (0.0267)
MV -0.3640 *** -0.4320 *** -0.3619 *** -0.4321 ***
(0.0104) (0.0211) (0.0105) (0.0211)
CROSS 0.0742 ** 0.0178 0.0713 ** 0.0176
(0.0357) (0.0769) (0.0357) (0.0769)
VAR 0.0089 ** 0.0025
(0.0043) (0.0037)
VOL -11.6351 *** 0.4398
(3.8185) (2.4349)
AR(1) 0.7658 *** 0.7416 *** 0.7416 ***
(0.0071) (0.0074) (0.0074)
R-Squared 0.8081 0.9201 0.8325 0.9238 0.8327 0.9238
Durbin-Watson Statistic 0.4715 2.2872 0.5230 2.2941 0.5260 2.2949
 Table 4: Impact of Regulatory Changes on Bid Ask Spreads 
 
Note: *** Significant at 1%,  ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample consists of 8330 firm months observations. All 
yearly means were calculated as calendar years with the exception of the post change period where the 
sample ran from April 2003 to March 2004. T-Stats were calculated using the matched pairs t-test. The 
dependent variable in all models is BA defined as the natural log of the monthly average of the daily ask 
price minus the bid price divided by the midpoint of the spreads. Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
firm months after December 2003, the time of the regulatory change. MV is the natural log of the firms 
market capitalization averaged for the calendar month.  CROSS is a dummy variable that equals 1 for those 
months in which a firm is cross-listed on another exchange. VAR represents the return volatility of the firm 
and is defined as the natural log of the variance of returns over the period -30,0, averaged over each 
calendar month. VOL represents the firms liquidity and is defined as the monthly average of the daily dollar 
value of trading divided by the market value of the company. AR(1) is an autoregressive term where the 
coefficient is fixed across cross-sectional units. 
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Figure 2: Rolling Regressions of the Bid Ask Spread against a Constant 
 
Note- The vertical axis represents the estimate from a regression run on the previous 100 
daily bid ask spreads averaged over 85 companies against a constant. The daily bid ask 
spread is defined as the natural logarithm of the bid price minus the ask price divided by 
the midpoint of the spreads. The vertical line represents the date the new legislation came 
into force.   
 
Liquidity 
Ausbel (1990) built on the earlier models of insider trading by trying to quantify the 
impact of insider trading on investor confidence. One of the conclusions she makes, 
in line with the models of Kyle (1985) Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Copeland and 
Galai (1988), is that loss of investor confidence impacts negatively on the liquidity in 
a market. Investors feeling uncertain about their prospects of getting a fair deal are 
put off the market and reduce their investment in the market. This finding was also 
supported by the model of Fishman and Hagerty (1995) who concluded that insider 
trading harms outsiders which results in investors withdrawing from the market. As 
discussed above, the new laws should result in less insider trading as they trade only 
when their information will compensate for the increased cost of insider trading. As a 
result the liquidity of the sample firms should increase following the new laws 
introduction.  
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Panel A of Table 5 presents the results for liquidity. As can be seen the results 
strongly support an increase in liquidity following the introduction of the Securities 
Market Amendment Act 2002. The average of the sample has increased from around 
.08% of the firms value traded per day, to .12%, a marked increase and nearly 
double the change period. The increase in liquidity is also significant across the 
board at the 5% level or better in all years. The only exception to this is the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test value for 1996 which has a p-value of .11. The rolling regressions in 
Figure 3 again strongly support this finding with an almost immediate increase 
following the introduction of the new law to a higher level than is observed at any 
point in the pre change period. The increase is relatively sharp with the new level 
being reached by June 2003.  
 
Panel B Table 5 also provides evidence to support the notion that the 
legislative changes have had an impact on insider trading. In all four model 
specifications the POST variable is positive and significant at the 1% level. Due to 
the use of market capitalisation as a denominator in the construction of the liquidity 
variable, MV was excluded from the regressions to avoid spurious relationships 
induced by the variable construction. We include BA instead due to the impact that 
spreads have on liquidity. The results show that CROSS somewhat surprisingly has 
no impact on the volume traded, although BA is significant in both Models 3 and 4, 
although only at the 10% level in Model 4. The adjusted R2 shows that while the 
models are not as strong as those for dividend yield and bid ask spread, the model 
does appear to explain a reasonable amount of the variation in the liquidity. The 
results overall provide strong evidence that liquidity in the sample firms increased in 
the period following the introduction of the new insider trading laws.  
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Panel A: Difference in Mean Liquidity
Mean T-Stat p -values
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank p -values
Pre Regulation Change
1996 0.0008 2.5412 0.0129 1.2028 0.1145
1997 0.0008 2.4695 0.0156 2.0485 0.0203
1998 0.0007 2.9096 0.0046 1.9311 0.0267
1999 0.0008 2.3514 0.0211 2.1050 0.0176
2000 0.0008 2.7762 0.0068 2.2923 0.0109
2001 0.0008 3.0935 0.0027 2.3369 0.0097
Change Period
2002 0.0006 3.9622 0.0002 4.1253 0.0000
Post Change
Post 0.0012
Panel B: Panel Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Post 0.0003 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0002 ***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
CROSS -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
BA -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *
(0.0000) (0.0000)
AR(1) 0.2776 *** 0.2767 ***
(0.0105) (0.0105)
R-Squared 0.1881 0.2530 0.1889 0.2532
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.4378 2.0654 1.4403 2.0652  
Table 5: Impact of Regulatory Change on Liquidity 
 
Note: *** Significant at 1%,  ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample consists of 8330 firm months observations. All 
yearly means were calculated as calendar years with the exception of the post change period where the 
sample ran from April 2003 to March 2004. T-Stats were calculated using the matched pairs t-test. The 
dependent variable in all models is VOL defined as the monthly average of the daily dollar value of 
trading divided by the market value of the company. Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firm 
months after December 2003, the time of the regulatory change. CROSS is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for those months in which a firm is cross-listed on another exchange. BA defined as the 
natural log of the monthly average of the daily ask price minus the bid price divided by the midpoint of 
the spreads AR(1) is an autoregressive term where the coefficient is fixed across cross-sectional units. 
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Figure 3: Rolling Regressions of Liquidity against a Constant 
 
Note- The vertical axis represents the estimate from a regression run on the previous 100 daily 
liquidity averaged over 85 companies against a constant. The liquidity is defined as the dollar 
value of trading divided by the current market capitalisation. The vertical line represents the 
date the new legislation came into force.   
 
Volatility  
The final measure examined is volatility. Kyle (1985) argued that insider trading 
reduced the depth of a market making stocks more prone to price shocks and 
increased volatility. Therefore, another sign of an improvement in the market brought 
about by a reduction in insider trading would be a significant decrease in the volatility 
of the market.  
 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the mean volatility before and after the law 
change. The results support the belief that the volatility of shares has decreased 
compared with all years except 1996. While 1996 for both the t-test and the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test is insignificant, every other year is significant, in all but 1997 at the 
1% level. There also appears to be a similar pre-emption to that observed in the 
dividend yield with the mean for 2002 being larger than those in the pre change 
period and the significance down to the 10% level for the t-test. The pattern depicted 
in Figure 4 is also consistent with the decrease in volatility occurring during a u shape 
dip in volatility that climbs back up before the date the new regime came into effect. 
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Once the new law is enacted there is a significant and sharp decrease in the 
volatility.  
 
 
Panel A: Differences in the Return Volatility Means
Mean T-Stat p -values Wilcoxon p -values
Pre Regulation Change
1996 -8.2281 1.1959 0.2351 -0.2631 0.3962
1997 -8.0981 2.3293 0.0222 1.7461 0.0404
1998 -7.6468 6.9550 0.0000 5.6104 0.0000
1999 -7.9400 3.6478 0.0005 4.2178 0.0000
2000 -7.7784 6.2686 0.0000 5.1349 0.0000
2001 -7.8299 5.0419 0.0000 4.5176 0.0000
Change Period
2002 -8.1669 1.7179 0.0895 1.9347 0.0265
Post Change
Post -8.3935
Panel B: Panel Regression Results 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Post -0.2968 *** -0.1618 ** -0.3101 *** -0.1647 **
(0.0363) (0.0644) (0.0365) (0.0646)
MV -0.2172 *** -0.0735
(0.0265) (0.0500)
CROSS 0.1476 0.1027
(0.0906) (0.1765)
AR(1) 0.6383 *** 0.6363 ***
(0.0085) (0.0085)
R-Squared 0.4640 0.6814 0.4683 0.6814
Durbin-Watson Statistic 0.7269 1.8675 0.7352 1.8662
 Table 6: Impact of Regulatory Changes on Return Volatility 
 
Note: *** Significant at 1%,  ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample consists of 8330 firm months observations. All 
yearly means were calculated as calendar years with the exception of the post change period where 
the sample ran from April 2003 to March 2004. T-Stats were calculated using the matched pairs t-test. 
The dependent variable in all models is VAR defined as the natural log of the variance of returns over 
the period -30,0, averaged over each calendar month.  Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firm 
months after December 2003, the time of the regulatory change. MV is the natural log of the firms 
market capitalization averaged for the calendar month. CROSS is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
those months in which a firm is cross-listed on another exchange. AR(1) is an autoregressive term 
where the coefficient is fixed across cross-sectional units. 
 
The panel regressions in Panel B of Table 6 also provide firm support for the 
impact of regulatory change. There is a strong negative association between VOL 
and POST. The relationship does however weaken when serial correlation in the 
errors is controlled for. The results also show that the negative and significant 
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relationship between VAR and MV disappears when the autoregressive term is 
included. This is in contrast to dividend yields and the spreads where the MV 
retained its significance. The results also show no connection between volatility and 
CROSS which supports the cross correlations presented in Table 2. Again the model 
specifications used result in strong R2 values with values between .46 and .68, 
suggesting that the models are explaining a sizeable portion of the variation in the 
volatility in the sample. The results as a whole suggest that volatility has decreased 
with the introduction of the new laws.  
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Figure 4: Rolling Regressions of Share Volatility against a Constant 
 
Note- The vertical axis represents the estimate from a regression run on the previous 
100 day’s share volatility averaged over 85 companies against a constant. The share 
volatility was defined as the natural log of the variance in returns over the previous 30 
days. The vertical line represents the date the new legislation came into force.   
 
The results for all four measures show strong support for the contention that 
the introduction of the new law has resulted in a marked change in the structure of 
the market. Dividend yields, bid ask spreads and volatility have all seen substantial 
decreases in the average level since the change in regulations while the liquidity has 
significantly increased. For all measures the change can be shown to have occurred 
on or very soon after the change in the laws supporting the view that the structural 
change has occurred as a result of the change in the insider trading laws. The results 
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also show that even controlling for other known determinants of the measures 
employed the dummy variable for the post change period, POST, is significant in all 
cases, at the 1% level in most model specifications. The models used also show high 
R2 values especially for the dividend yield and bid ask spreads suggesting an 
extremely good fit. The new laws appear to have been effective in increasing the cost 
of insider trading and lowering its incidence and therefore the harm that it causes to 
the market microstructure. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper set out to examine whether the new insider trading laws in New Zealand 
have resulted in the expected improvements in the market as a result of the 
hypothesised reduction in the incidence of insider trading. This was achieved by 
comparing four variables that have been shown to be impacted by insider trading. 
The variables examined were the dividend yield which was used to proxy for the cost 
of capital, the natural log of the bid-ask spread, liquidity measured as the daily 
percentage of the firm’s market capitalisation traded and finally the natural log of the 
volatility. If the new laws have had the expected effect you should see reductions in 
the cost of capital, spreads and return volatility accompanied by an increase in the 
liquidity. Our results provide strong support for the notion that the new regulatory 
regime has had a positive impact on the market, as well as adding to the evidence 
that regulations do have a role in protecting the market from insiders. For all the 
variables a significant change in the average level of the variables was observed 
after the introduction of the new laws. The results overall provided strong evidence 
that the regulatory changes have resulted in a significant reduction of the 
microstructure effects of insider trading.  
 
Several questions remain that should be the subject of future research. The 
first is the impact of the enforcement actions on the changes that have been 
observed following the introduction of the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002. In 
particular, it appears that the lack of confidence in the previous regime was a 
consequence of failed prosecutions in the early 1990’s and the lack of successful 
prosecutions over its entire life. It would therefore be interesting to observe the 
markets reaction to any future prosecutions to see whether the changes become 
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cemented or are undone by their success or failure. Further research is needed to 
see the effects of insider trading in New Zealand stack up with other regulated 
markets. While the results show a significant improvement, they provide no insight 
into whether the current legal structure is the most effective one available.  
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Endnotes 
1. The profitability of self-reported insider transactions has been examined in the U.S. (Finnerty, 
1976; Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001), Canada (Baesel and Stein, 1979) Spain 
(Del Brio, Miguel and Perote, 2002), Poland (Wisniewski and Bohl, 2004), New Zealand 
(Eterbari, Tourani-Rad and Gilbert, 2003) and U.K. (Pope et al., 1990; Friederich et al., 2002). 
2. These were the cases of Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Wilson Neill Ltd [1994] 
MCLR 134 and Kincaid v Capital Markets Equities Ltd (1995) 1 ACSR 53. Both were cases 
attempting to force the respective companies to take an action against insiders under s18. In 
both cases the courts ruled the companies had good reason not to take the case and declined 
leave to force the companies to act.  
3. Exchanges rates against the USD over this time for January of each year were 1996 1.5137, 
1997 1.4247, 1998 1.7283, 1999 1.8545, 2000 1.9451, 2001 2.2502, 2002 2.3551 2003 
1.8505 and 2004 1.4863. 
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